



Deep dive on Climate Regime Principles Linking action to hope and equity

**Climate Justice Dialogue - Mobilizing Bold Action
Santiago de Chile, April 2013**

Jose Alberto Garibaldi

Some Initial observations on the UNFCCC as an institution

- The Climate institutions are set of rules – emerging from interactions by agents
- These take place within a multilateral regime, encompassing in principle all parties
- Agents' play games – these:
 - shape rules
 - interpret principles
- Agents choose actions within domestic and international circumstances – context counts.

The context of the problem

Late 1990s – early 2000s

World Politics & Economics

Developed countries decisively lead global economy
Clear division with developing countries
US/EU tension

Research & Knowledge

Arguments over CC certainty; Research focused on action by developed countries and co-benefits

Group dynamics

Division between A1 & NA!; groups within these with little internal differentiation, larger countries leading positions within groups.


Negotiation dynamics

A zero sum game; action only where cobenefits; EU pursuing G77 deal against US to enhance own reputation

Interpreting the Convention 1993-2007 / the KP world

A1: We will act, but you people must do something:

NA1: That's your problem; not ours



The research issue:

What A1 is doing and whether this is enough


Focus on KP (2005)

A1 committed to reductions;
NA1 committed to report.

**Firewall and CBDR central
Buttressed by Brazilian proposal**

Interpreting the Convention 2007 – 2009 / the BAP

Not our problem – but maybe we might do something



Research emphasis Shifts:

Sharing the burden of mitigation.

BASIC project

Emergence of Stern / IPCC

Small number of key players


BAP maintains the firewall...

Differentiated instances to facilitate further action by developing country parties.

Interpreting the Convention 2009- 10 / Cancun agreements

**We will all have equal compromises...
but a diversity of actions**

**What each one does
will be measured.**




Cancun creates a structure to accommodate “goals and commitments” and “diversity of actions”

- Instruments to support and measure both – on both sides.
- In exchange for new bodies on finance and adaptation

- **Diversity of actions will be supported**
- **Differentiation enhanced**
- **More new players – not only large parties**

Interpretation the Convention 2011-12 / Durban – Doha

We will be in this all together...



A (regime) applicable to all

Equitable Access to sustainable development is raised as a principle

What does this imply?

Durban creates a platform for a new 2020 regime

With a binding agreement applicable to all...

And with immediate actions (2015), & post 2020

Equity views

Larger *Developing* Country parties

- Equity = Atmospheric space = right to emit
- Right to emit = right to develop
- Debate: how best to articulate right to emit globally: per capita, carbon budgets, intensities
- Problem to solve: zero sum game in mitigation, focus on equity of effort, and differentiation in reporting
 - Primary role for large emitters
 - Secondary role for small or medium parties
- Effort to present this as a common development position of all DCs
 - Small and medium piggyback on view of equity of larger emitters

Equity views

Larger *Developed* Country parties

- Sharing that diagnosis?
- Equity = key to unlock action? Large emitter focus
- Willing to agree on debate around how best to articulate right to emit globally: per capita, carbon budgets, intensities
- Problem to solve: symmetry, equal treatment and burden sharing
 - Primary role for large emitters
 - Secondary role for small or medium parties
- Division between
 - domestic and international action
 - mitigation and adaptation

Not clear where these views turn into a race to do more

A sense of the vision of the rest:

Why not focus on collectively avoiding impacts and creating opportunities?

- Convention's ultimate objective is not CBDR or development
- Neither is it equity or equitable access to sustainable development
- It is avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
- And all parties, large or small, have a direct stake in this objective– avoiding CC impacts
- From here
 - Expanding opportunities for mutual gains in impact avoidance through cooperation (i.e. non zero sum games opportunities)
 - A need for early incentives for action by all
 - CBDR & RC
 - A common interest in the BAP and Cancun institutions deployed to support action and cooperation – on both sides

More action, more cooperation

There are multiple different collective allocations and impacts possible...


- Commitments for action lead and expanded global carbon market, climate finance and technology transfer
- A dual institutional equilibrium in climate regime:
 - Cautious and shy – little if at all some contributions - diminished size for carbon market, and climate spoiled
 - Bold and deep – expanded contributions to carbon markets, climate might be saved
- Assess collective outcomes considering all costs deriving from all parties' stated actions
- A collective focus: all parties can make a difference

Not a new approach – developed by LAC parties with Energeia in 2008- 2009 within an ongoing regional workshop


Are DCs better off the more ambitious the regime – for all?

Assessing the world emerging in 2009 – 2010

Shy scenario (low ambition)



Bold scenario (high ambition)



Carbon markets went from having no trading at all, to having perfectly flexible, encompassing forest and all sectors

5 scenarios, with differentiated low to very high ambition:


Modelling options from 2008 to 2010 offered USA, Japan, Canada, EU, Russia from 2008 to 2010 and further additional actions

- -5% and -35% (2020 & 2050) to
- -35% and -95% (idem)

NA1 from:

- doing nothing to
- -10, -15, and -20% BAU deviation (2020, 2030, and 2050) to
- -35, -45, and -45% (idem)

Assessing the idea



Seems to be mostly the case:

Latin America – holds in all cases

Forestry fungibility, expansion of trading sectors and supplementarity restrictions crucial

	2.020	2030	2.040
Low	15.419	37.903	60.387
Current	14.956	31.936	53.137
Effort	11.775	24.108	32.375
High	-2.236	9.388	42.989
Very High	-32.699	-14.241	23.092

South East Asia -holds in all cases

Idem. Impacts reduced by 6 GDP points per year;

SE Asia	2020	2030	2040
Low	76207.1	188263	628539
Current	75773	181467	599709
Effort	74167.2	174509	544640
High	72818.2	170290	529927
V. High	69068	169810	472868

India and South Asia - holds to effort (middle) scenario

Holds in low, current and effort scenarios, also in the very high one, but require bridge in finance.

S. Asia	2020	2030	2040
Low	76207.1	188263	628538.5
Current	75599.6	179938	594657.8
Effort	74951.3	175741	499479.7
High	78758.3	178095	500932.8
V. High	87696.9	195976	454623.9

China and East Asia –kicks in later

Holds from the current scenario and up to the medium in 2030; then again in high and very high as money gets out of forests.

China	2020	2030	2050
Low	241.67	736.84	4124.81
Current	-531.83	-14795.07	-14449.7
Effort	592.96	-7898.12	-125709.6
High	10522.21	6811.2	-65194.56
V. High	10505.86	6698.12	-66182.47

Consequences on research

- Problem misdiagnosed: for a majority, major costs are impacts not mitigation
- Equity - focus on avoiding impacts, convention objectives
- Emphasis on allocation and access to a transformative development – not on emitting more
- Based on bold and differentiated action by all
- Considering circumstances:
 - Smaller parties cannot support impacts, larger parties can.
 - Larger parties need to reduce, smaller parties need avoid increase
- Not trade paradigm - what is needed now is not what will be needed tomorrow
- Dynamism and flexibility to accommodate all

Consequences on principles

- Action important on its own - not only linked to equity
- Hope and responsibility central - not only justice
- Equity = equity of outcomes / intergenerational / Across groups
- Development = transformative development
- CBDR = CBDR&RC – a prompt for action
- National circumstances = opportunity, not an excuse.
- Importance of the morality and leadership of the own example as an collective action prompt – regardless of size
- All parties relevant – particularly those suffering and willing to act

Debate: how about finding collective allocation solutions were we all contribute and cooperate to do more...soon?

All this possible within existing convention principles:

Consequences on negotiations

- Emphasize collective focus on need to avoid impacts
- Walk the talk: press more larger emitters with own example – wherever they are grouped
- Trade resulting mitigation action and regime advances for:
 - further collective support
 - incentives for enhanced leadership by early and ambitious movers – big, small or tiny
- Align and press for carbon markets and finance for enhanced action: a solution cannot be achieved if both are constrained
- Time is of the essence: structure negotiations so all areas can advance, diminish blockage potential
- Support and learn from other parties or groups, large or small, willing to stand up and do the same.

What has this group of countries done?

More things that I can count, but will focus on those we have supported from Energeia

EOB – an analysis around parties' actions and an interpretation around UNFCCC principles


Since 2009

Workshop to increase the scale of responses (meeting 11 times since 2006: with at least an equal number of collective submissions

Interregional workshops – across G77 groups (in Punta Cana & Bali)

Supported each others' negotiators since Bali - not to lose capacity

What this approach has deployed – by 2013



Could this make it?

The chances of a virtuous cycle at scale

MICs could contribute a substantial scale of emission reductions – between 0.7 to 1.2 G, from countries emitting less than 0.5 Gtons in SEA, LAC, AOSIS and parts of Africa are considered.

not that far from China proposed reductions (1.3 Gtns). Not that far from those committed by the US.

- This approach is internally consistent: it practices what it preaches and is part of the solution, not the problem
- Takes the principles of the convention on its literal meaning
- Focus on areas where cooperation is possible, making the most of their circumstances
- Does not separate domestic and international interests

A virtuous cycle at scale:

enhances chances of forming larger coalitions encompassing larger emitting parties and gradually but promptly move to trajectories between 1.5 and 2 degrees.

Reduces costs of required mitigation targets by A1 parties would be diminished (compared to the alternative, where these regime mechanisms were not present).

Reduces major costs of developing countries - impacts